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Placement Director: Alberto Bisin	alberto.bisin@nyu.edu	212-992-8916
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Education

PhD. In Economics, New York University, 2013-2019 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Essays on Attention, Information and Choice*
M.A. in Economic Analysis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2011-2013
B.A. in Applied Economics, Eötvös Lóránd University, Budapest, 2008-2011

References

Professor Andrew Caplin
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Professor Andrew Schotter
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Professor Timothy Christensen
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Teaching and Research Fields

Research fields: Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics and Applied Econometrics

Teaching Experience

Fall, 2018	Microeconomics, NYU Stern School of Business, teaching fellow for Professor Luís Cabral
Fall, 2017	Microeconomics, NYU Stern School of Business, teaching fellow for Professor Simon Bowmaker
Fall, 2017	Introduction to Microeconomics, NYU, teaching assistant for Professor Maharukh Bhiladwalla
Summer, 2017	Industrial Organization, NYU, instructor

Spring, 2017	Data Bootcamp (Python), NYU Stern School of Business, instructor
Fall, 2016	Introduction to Microeconomics, NYU, teaching assistant for Professor Andrew Paizis
Summer, 2016	Industrial Organization, NYU, instructor
Spring, 2016	Microeconomics, NYU Stern School of Business, teaching fellow for Professor Maryam Saeedi
Fall, 2015	Statistics, NYU, teaching assistant for Ercan Karadas
Spring, 2015	Topics in Econometrics, NYU, teaching assistant for Professor José Luis Montiel Olea
Fall, 2012	Game Theory (graduate), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, teaching assistant for Professor Jordi Massó
Fall, 2012	Reinforcement in Calculus and Statistics, Barcelona GSE, instructor

Research Experience and Other Employment

2016-2017	QuantEcon.org, research assistant for Professor Thomas J. Sargent and Professor John Stachurski
Spring, 2011	Tárki Social Research Institute, intern
Summer, 2009	Budapest Institute for Policy Analysis, intern

Professional Activities

Referee	Econometrica, Economic Inquiry
Conferences	Student Workshop in Experimental Economics Techniques (Columbia, 2018), Young Economists Symposium (NYU, 2018), Bounded Rationality in Choice (attendee, Columbia, 2018, NYU, 2015)

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2013-2018	Henry M. MacCracken Fellowship
2011-2013	Graduate Fellowship, Fundació Catalunya – La Pedrera
2011	Best Undergraduate Thesis in Economics, Eötvös Lóránd University, Budapest

Research Papers

Attentional Complements (Job Market Paper)

I study how attentional constraints affect elasticity and substitution patterns in demand. I identify "attentional complementarity", whereby goods that are substitutes in utility appear as complements in behavior due to limits on attention. Adopting the framework of rational inattention, I identify the channels through which attention influences observed substitution patterns. The in-sample fit of these models can be similar to that of standard discrete choice models, yet counterfactual predictions differ substantially when attentional frictions are accounted for. I provide conditions for identification of the general rational inattention model in standard stochastic choice data. A key obstacle in estimation is the

genericity of corner solutions which endogenously gives rise to consideration sets. The estimation strategy I employ is robust to this feature. In an empirical application, I show that elasticities are underestimated by models not accounting for attentional frictions. I conduct an experiment allowing for the detailed analysis of attention strategies and find that subjects allocate their attention in line with the theory.

Rational Inattention, Competitive Supply, and Psychometrics
(with Andrew Caplin, John Leahy and Oded Nov)

Costs of attention, while central to choice behavior, have proven hard to measure. We introduce a simple method of recovering them from choice data. Our recovery method rests on the observation that costs of attention play precisely the same role in consumer choice as do a competitive firm's costs of production in its supply decision. This analogy extends to welfare analysis: consumer welfare net of attention costs is measured in precisely the same way as the profits of a competitive firm. We implement our recovery method in a purpose-built experiment. We quantitatively assess the trade-off between reward level and task complexity. Estimated attention costs are highly correlated with decision time, an important common input in process-based models of attention.

Range Effects in Multi-attribute Choice: An Experiment
(with Tommaso Bondi and Evan K. Friedman)

Several behavioral theories suggest that, when choosing between multi-attribute goods, choices are systematically affected by the range of values in each attribute. Two theories provide such predictions explicitly in terms of attribute ranges. According to the theory of Focusing (Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013), attributes with larger ranges receive more attention. On the other hand, Relative thinking (Bushong, Rabin, and Schwartzstein, 2017) posits that fixed differences look smaller when the range is large. It is as if attributes with larger ranges are over- and under-weighted, respectively. Since the two theories make opposing predictions, it is important to understand what features of the environment affect their relative prevalence. We conduct an experiment designed to test for both of these opposing range effects in different environments. Using choice under risk, we use a two-by-two design defined by high or low stakes and high or low dimensionality (as measured by the number of attributes). In the aggregate, we find evidence of focusing in low-dimensional treatments. Classifying subjects into focusers and relative thinkers, we find that focusers are associated with quicker response times and that types are more stable when the stakes are high.

Learning with Misspecified Models
(with Bálint Szőke)

We consider Bayesian learning about a stable environment when the learner’s entertained probability distributions (likelihoods) are all misspecified. We evaluate likelihoods according to the long-run average payoff of the policy function they induce. We then show, that generically, the value that the Bayesian learner attains in the long run is lower than what would be achievable with her misspecified set of likelihoods. We introduce two kinds of indifference curves over the learner’s set: one based on the likelihoods’ induced long-run average payoff, and another capturing their statistical similarity. In case of misspecification, we show that misalignment of these curves can lead the Bayesian learner to focus on payoff-irrelevant features of the environment. On the other hand, under correct specification this misalignment has no bite. We provide conditions under which it is feasible to construct an exponential family that allows the learner to implement the best attainable policy in the long-run irrespective of misspecification. We demonstrate applications of the introduced concepts through examples.